Mosquito Safety and Efficacy Trials: Critical Evaluation of Wolbachia Infection Study

 Critical Evaluation of Wolbachia Infection Study in Aedes aegypti in Yogyakarta

By: Richard Claproth

The preliminary study on Wolbachia infection in Aedes aegypti mosquitoes in Yogyakarta, published in a journal that has been banned by BRIN due to perceived doubts, is titled "Prevalence and Distribution of Dengue Virus in Aedes aegypti in Yogyakarta City before Deployment of Wolbachia-Infected Aedes aegypti," which can be downloaded here.

It should be understood that this research serves as the basis for spreading Wolbachia-infected mosquitoes in Indonesia.

The critical opinions below not only focus on the research methodology but also extend to the overall project's aspects, given its serious implications for ecosystems and public health. Policymakers are urged to halt the spread of millions infected with Wolbachia in Indonesia.

1. Methodological Limitations:

• The study relies on the One-Step Multiplex Real-Time PCR method for dengue virus detection. The sustainability and validity of these results need further evaluation using additional methods and verification techniques.
• One-Step Multiplex Real-Time PCR Method: This method has limitations in sensitivity and specificity. The study solely relies on one method for detecting dengue virus in mosquitoes. The use of additional methods, such as virus culture or alternative molecular methods, is needed to verify results and enhance confidence in the generated data. Due to method limitations, the sustainability of this study's results needs questioning. The addition of more valid methods and diversified detection techniques can provide a more accurate and reliable picture. This method is not sensitive enough to the genetic variations of the dengue virus that can affect detection results. The use of more advanced molecular techniques can address this uncertainty. Method limitations can trigger potential biases in result analysis. The addition of extra methods and verification techniques can help identify and reduce potential biases that may occur.

2. Limited Sample Representation:

• The taken samples may not adequately represent the environmental and condition variations throughout Yogyakarta City, which can influence result applicability at the national level.
• The number of samples taken over five months does not cover sufficient variations in environmental and geographical conditions across the research area. The selection of locations and sample collection periods should reflect the diversity of conditions that may affect dengue transmission.

3. Limited Duration:

• Lack of Seasonal Variation Coverage: Five months is a short period to observe seasonal variations in dengue transmission and mosquito activity. This limited time overlooks fluctuations that can occur during the rainy and dry seasons, significantly impacting the reproduction and activity of Aedes aegypti.
• Lack of Mosquito Life Cycle Coverage: The mosquito life cycle involves larval, pupal, and adult stages. Five months may not cover the entire life cycle, resulting in an inadequate understanding of how seasonal factors affect the reproduction and survival of Aedes aegypti.
• Unobserved Variability in Mosquito Populations: The short study period may fail to capture changes in mosquito populations that can occur significantly over a longer period. Fluctuations in mosquito numbers can directly impact dengue virus prevalence.
• Lack of Long-Term Pattern Identification: A five-month study does not provide a complete picture of the long-term patterns of dengue transmission. The long-term effects of environmental, climatic, and dengue transmission sustainability factors may not be fully revealed.
• Inadequate Assessment of Epidemiological Dynamics: The limited duration does not allow for a comprehensive analysis of dengue epidemiological dynamics, including identifying long-term trends, transmission cycles, and evolving risk factors over time.
• Inadequate Assessment of Epidemiological Dynamics: The limited duration does not allow for a comprehensive analysis of dengue epidemiological dynamics, including identifying long-term trends, transmission cycles, and evolving risk factors over time.

4. Focus on Aedes aegypti:

• The study focuses on Aedes aegypti, while Aedes albopictus can also be a potential vector. A comprehensive evaluation of the role of Aedes albopictus in dengue spread should also be considered.
• Neglect of Aedes albopictus: The study exclusively focuses on Aedes aegypti, overlooking the potential role of Aedes albopictus as a dengue vector. Aedes albopictus is known as an alternative vector and can significantly contribute to dengue virus transmission.
• Potential Inaccuracy of Information: Neglecting Aedes albopictus can lead to inaccuracies in understanding the dynamics of dengue transmission. Comprehensive information about both mosquito species is essential for planning and implementing effective control strategies.
• Limited Impact on Dengue Control: The study's focus only on Aedes aegypti may limit the relevance of findings to overall dengue control efforts. Aedes albopictus should be comprehensively evaluated to understand the complete picture of dengue transmission risk.
• Need for Evaluation of Aedes albopictus Role: A comprehensive evaluation of the role of Aedes albopictus in dengue spread should be the focus of further studies. Continued research should include identification, monitoring, and analysis of Aedes albopictus's contribution to dengue virus transmission.
• Importance of a Multivector Approach: To fully understand the dynamics of dengue transmission, it is crucial to adopt a multivector approach that considers the relative contributions of both Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus. Focusing only on one vector may overlook the actual variability and complexity in the dengue transmission ecosystem.

5. Lack of Epidemiological Analysis:

• The study has not provided a sufficiently in-depth epidemiological analysis regarding the correlation between dengue virus infection in mosquitoes and the number of dengue cases in humans.
• Lack of Correlation Analysis: The study fails to provide adequate epidemiological analysis to explain the correlation between dengue virus infection in mosquitoes and the number of dengue cases in humans. This inability diminishes the understanding of the relationship between mosquitoes as vectors and the burden of dengue disease in the human population.
• Limitations in Epidemiological Information: The lack of epidemiological analysis results in limitations in providing in-depth insights into the impact of dengue virus infection in mosquitoes on the occurrence of dengue disease in humans. This information is crucial for the development of control and mitigation strategies.
• Lack of Presentation of Epidemiological Data: The study does not provide adequate presentation of epidemiological data, such as dengue incidence trends, seasonal patterns, and other epidemiological characteristics. This hinders the ability to make significant epidemiological inferences.
• Absence of Risk Factor Analysis: More in-depth epidemiological analysis typically includes the identification of risk factors contributing to increased dengue cases. The study lacks information regarding these risk factors.
• Unclear Implications for Control: Without adequate epidemiological analysis, the implications and relevance of the study's findings for dengue control and risk mitigation strategies become unclear. Effective control strategies require a comprehensive understanding of the epidemiological dynamics of the disease.

6. Lack of Ecosystem Impact Assessment:

• The ecological impact of spreading millions of Wolbachia-infected mosquitoes has not been adequately evaluated. Risks to the ecosystem and biodiversity need further analysis.
• Unevaluated Ecological Impact: This study does not provide a sufficient evaluation of the ecological impact of spreading millions of Wolbachia-infected mosquitoes. This creates uncertainty about the long-term consequences of this large-scale intervention on the local ecosystem.
• Uncertainty Regarding Ecosystem Risks: Potential risks to the ecosystem and biodiversity, both arising from the introduction of Wolbachia-infected mosquitoes and their impact on non-target organisms, have not been analyzed in detail. The lack of this assessment creates uncertainty about potential ecosystem impacts.
• Need for In-Depth Risk Analysis: A more in-depth risk analysis is required to evaluate possible side effects on other organisms in the ecosystem. Comprehensive ecological studies can provide a better understanding of the complexity of Wolbachia's impact on ecosystem balance.
• Sustainability and Ecological Monitoring: The lack of emphasis on sustainability and ecological monitoring indicates a deficiency in study planning. Ecosystem impact assessments should involve long-term monitoring to capture effects over a sufficiently extended period.
• Local Ecological Knowledge Limitations: This study inadequately considers local ecological knowledge that could enrich the understanding of the ecosystem where Wolbachia-infected mosquitoes are introduced. Involvement of local ecological experts could be an added value.

7. Lack of Inclusion of Environmental Factors:

• The study may not have comprehensively included environmental factors, such as housing conditions, sanitation, and human population density, which can affect dengue virus spread.
• Limitations in Understanding Environmental Factors: This study does not provide a comprehensive overview of environmental factors that can affect dengue virus spread. Limited understanding of housing conditions, sanitation, and human population density can hinder the interpretation of research results.
• Limitations in Explaining Ecosystem-Human Interactions: Not including environmental factors comprehensively can limit the study's ability to explain the complex interactions between the ecosystem, vector mosquitoes, and the human population. This can inhibit a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of dengue virus spread.
• Lack of Multivariable Analysis: Limitations in including environmental factors also affect the study's ability to perform adequate multivariable analysis. More complex analyses can provide better insights into the relative contribution of environmental factors to dengue virus spread.
• Need for Integration of Environmental Data: This study needs to benefit from the integration of more detailed environmental data, including variables such as housing cleanliness, sanitation patterns, and population density. Integrating this data can result in a deeper understanding of the environmental context.

8. Lack of Community Involvement:

• Community involvement in the planning and implementation of this project may not be adequately represented. Community participation should be the main focus to achieve sustainability.
• Suboptimal Community Involvement: This study does not emphasize community involvement sufficiently in the planning and implementation of the project. Lack of involvement can harm the sustainability of the project and the effectiveness of implementation in the field.
• Lack of Clear Community Involvement Plan: The absence of a clear plan on how the community is involved in the project can lead to a lack of support, understanding, and acceptance from involved parties. A more structured community involvement plan can enhance project effectiveness.
• Perception and Community Needs Gap: Not taking into account the gap between community perceptions and needs with the project plan can result in an imbalance in implementation. Optimal community involvement should reflect local aspirations and needs.
• Limitations in Addressing Local Challenges: Without involving the community comprehensively, the project struggles to identify and address local challenges that may arise during implementation. Community involvement can provide crucial insights into local dynamics.

Recommendations:

• Further and Longer Studies:
• Conduct further studies with a more comprehensive design and longer duration to understand the long-term effectiveness and impacts of the project.
• Ecosystem and Biodiversity Analysis:
• Investigate the ecological impacts and potential threats to biodiversity alongside the spread of Wolbachia-infected mosquitoes.
• In-Depth Epidemiological Analysis:
• Conduct a more in-depth epidemiological analysis to understand the relationship between mosquito infection and dengue cases in humans.
• Expansion to Aedes albopictus:
• Evaluate the role of Aedes albopictus as a potential vector, expanding the understanding of dengue spread comprehensively.
• Comprehensive Environmental Assessment:
• Include a more comprehensive environmental assessment, incorporating factors such as housing and human population density.
• Participatory Community Planning:
• Involve the community more actively in project planning and implementation, providing better education to them.
• Health and Safety Risk Analysis:
• Perform a comprehensive health and safety risk analysis related to human interaction with Wolbachia-infected mosquitoes.
• Independent Evaluation:
• Conduct an independent evaluation by experts not involved in the project to ensure the integrity and validity of the study results.

WHO's Head Scientist Is Oxitec Mosquito - 6.8Million to free millions while We were locked in our homes

Hint of things to come? 

Oxitec of the intentionally deformed mouths, aggressive males who even started biting, luminous gene, lethal gene, inherited transfer of zika that shrunk all those babies' heads are their first release. Oxitec is Jeremy Farrar's baby - 6.8 million he gave to set them free in 2021, while the actual human beings were locked down and many starving. Don't ever give money to the Wellcome Trust again if you were thinking of it. And ask the UK government if they'd like it if we made these mosquitoes here and sent them over there? So I look up who to ask my WHO Due Diligence Questions to, on behalf of all member states as I bet you 50p few countries have actually grasped it, and I found this sick man is Head Scientist. Are we screwed or will the gods intervene? I have a feeling the latter

Recommendation to reject the IHR Amendments/WHO Pandemic Treaty and leave the WHO

These are the instructions on how to reject the WHO IHR amendments, which will lead to the Pandemic Treaty, by no later than November 30th 2023.

https://www.un.org/pga/74/wp-content/uploads/sites/99/2020/06/Updated-Rev-marked-2-Procedure-for-decision-via-silence-procedure.pdf. 

The above link was the old procedure which took away the voting capabilities that previously existed and turned it into a “SILENT PROCEDURE”. The 2022 updated procedure is below. 

https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA75/A75(9)-en.pdf 

If you're not busy, listen to this album and read exactly what this email says AND DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT!

(Below are excerpts from the official first link above from the WHO on how to officially reject the WHO IHR Amendments)

4. If adopted, Member States wishing to make an explanation of position (except co-sponsors who are not allowed to make an explanation under rule 88 of the rules of procedure) may do so in any of the following ways, without prejudice to the delegations’ rights under the rules of procedure to explain their position at the first plenary meeting to be held in order for the General Assembly to take note of the decision after the cessation of the precautionary measures as soon as the circumstance allow: Option 1: electronic versions of the statements in explanation of position received within two weeks of the end of the silence procedure will be posted on the e-delegate portal, under Plenary announcements. Please indicate the title of the draft decision/resolution in the subject line of the e-mail to be sent to Ms. Ludette Quiogue at quiogue@un.org in the General Assembly Affairs Branch. Option 2: Member States can address their communication to the President of the General Assembly (to be sent to opga@un.org). If received prior or within the hour following the end of the silence procedure, it will then be circulated in a subsequent letter from the President to all Member States. If received afterwards, it will be posted on the e-delegate portal. Please clearly indicate the title of the draft decision/resolution in the subject line of the communication. Option 3: Member States can also address a communication to the SecretaryGeneral requesting the issuance of their communication. ! Such communications should be addressed to the Secretary-General and signed by the permanent representative or chargé d’affaires, a.i., of the permanent mission to the United Nations. ! The communications should indicate the session of the General Assembly, and the number and title of the agenda item under which circulation is requested, using the agenda of current session of the Assembly. ! A scanned copy of the original signed communications (PDF version) as well as their Microsoft Word versions should be sent together to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (sgcentral@un.org) with a copy to gaab@un.org and dms@un.org to facilitate processing. If versions in any other United Nations official languages are available, they should be included electronically with a clear indication of the original language and/or which language versions are to be used for reference only. 3 5. Member States wishing to make an objection may do so via a letter or Note Verbale addressed to the President of the General Assembly. Such correspondence should sent via email to opga@un.org. Please clearly indicate the title of the draft decision/resolution in the subject line of the communication. 6. If there are objections, the President of the General Assembly will circulate a letter informing that the silence has been broken.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/07/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-who.html

In 2020 President Trump did start the process of withdrawing from the WHO. This seems now to be the most logical process as it has been made clear that the mishandling of the Covid pandemic was largely in part of the WHO guidelines and recommendations to advertise a vaccine that did not work, and was later found to not be a vaccine. 

https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-takes-first-steps-to-withdraw-from-wto-who/

Other countries who are also within the BRICS alliance, realise the errors of the WHO, and are also trying to withdraw, so the precedent has been set. 

For one thing, the Nuremberg Code is in the constitution with Article 118b, and the misuse of genetic engineering on humans is prohibited in Switzerland under Article 119 of the Federal Constitution.  This is supplemented by Article 230bis of the Criminal Code, ... The perpetrators thus face up to 10 years in prison.  However, this ruling should also make the rest of the world sit up and take notice, because the Nuremberg Code has international validity and is also included in Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In the case of criminal charges, reference must be made in the declaration to the thalidomide scandal in order to lend special weight to the significance of this charge. So politics is in for a hot autumn. One should also know that the German lawyer Dr. Rainer Füllmich and more than 100 other German lawyers were involved in these trials.

https://www.foxnews.com/us/new-york-supreme-court-reinstates-all-employees-fired-being-unvaccinated-orders-backpay

No media is talking about it, neither in Switzerland nor in Europe.

Unfortunately, this only comes with a time delay again.

This is the letter from a number of countries that had already rejected the WHO Pandemic Treaty and IHR amendments.

 

https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4021159#record-files-collapse-header

Estonia rejects WHO pandemic treaty and amendments. The official letter is at the bottom of this website. 

https://www.thaimbc.com/2023/11/26/estonia-notifies-who-that-it-rejects-the-pandemic-treaty-and-amendments-to-international-health-regulations/

World Health Organisation’s International Health Regulations (IHR) 2005 Amendments Explained

https://apps.who.int/gb/wgihr/pdf_files/wgihr2/A_WGIHR2_6-en.pdf (Page 77 from the WHO website below)

Submission of the Indonesia Proposed Amendments to the International Health Regulations (2005) Articles 6, 18, 23, 31, 45 and Annex 6 Explanation of changes: 

(Highlighted sections in Blue. Added comments in Red)

Article 6 Notification 

1. Each State Party shall assess events occurring within its territory by using the decision instrument in Annex 2. Each State Party shall notify WHO, by the most efficient means of communication available, by way of the National IHR Focal Point, and within 24 hours of assessment of public health information, of all events which may constitute a public health emergency of international concern within its territory in accordance with the decision instrument, as well as any health measure implemented in response to those events. If the notification received by WHO involves the competency of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), WHO shall immediately notify the IAEA 

2. Following a notification, a State Party shall continue to communicate to WHO timely, accurate and sufficiently detailed public health information available to it on the notified event, where possible including case definitions, laboratory results, source and type of the risk, number of cases and deaths, conditions affecting the spread of the disease and the health measures employed, genome sequence data; and report, when necessary, the difficulties faced and support needed in responding to the potential public health emergency of international concern 

Article 6: 1-2 states We would like to withdraw the submission proposedly made by Indonesia because Article 6 mentions a nuclear agency, and we would need to explore further that there is not any risk that Indonesia will not lose control of their nuclear resources. This could include:

According to BRIN's Awaludin, Indonesia has uranium reserves of some 90,000 tonnes and thorium reserves of around 140,000 tonnes - enough to power 10 1,000MWe nuclear for 30 years.

“If i had to report that I have $20M of gold, and I have to report it, then the foreign WHO entity can take control of it”- example. Why should the WHO have records of what goods I have? This is an invasion of privacy.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): WHY ARE THEY APART OF THE HEALTH REGULATIONS??

Giving up lab results, and all public health information as stated is a violation of privacy of each country's Health regulations. Foreign entities should not have health records of any nations citizens. Countries should choose what info to give instead of being forced. 

Article 18 Recommendations with respect to persons, baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods and postal parcels 

1. Recommendations issued by WHO to States Parties with respect to persons may include the following advice:

 - no specific health measures are advised; 

- review travel history in affected areas; 

- review proof of medical examination and any laboratory analysis; 

- require medical examinations; 

- review proof of vaccination or other prophylaxis; - require vaccination or other prophylaxis; 

- place suspect persons under public health observation; - implement quarantine or other health measures for suspect persons; - implement isolation and treatment where necessary of affected persons; - implement tracing of contacts of suspect or affected persons; - refuse entry of suspect and affected persons; - refuse entry of unaffected persons to affected areas; and - implement exit screening and/or restrictions on persons from affected areas. 

Article 18, Point 1 is one all nations need to reject as this is totally unacceptable. It would allow the WHO/UN to have complete access and control of every country's baggage, cargo clothing, textiles, containers, goods, and postal parcels. This would give the WHO/UN complete control of a country’s logistics, shipping, and goods operation. This would no longer be a recommendation, but if each country does not opt out by letter by December 1st 2023, then this article will become law in May 2024.

This would also give the foreign UN/WHO entity control in all of the above for all 194 countries. This would be treasonous for any government official to give this much control to a foreign body that is controlled by the United Nations which the head office is in the United States, but also in Geneva, and Vienna. .

2. Recommendations issued by WHO to States Parties with respect to baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods and postal parcels may include the following advice: 

- no specific health measures are advised;

 - review manifest and routing; 

- implement inspections; 

- review proof of measures taken on departure or in transit to eliminate infection or 

- contamination; 

- implement treatment of the baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods, postal parcels or 

- human remains to remove infection or contamination, including vectors and reservoirs; 

- the use of specific health measures to ensure the safe handling and transport of human remains; 

- implement isolation or quarantine; 

- seizure and destruction of infected or contaminated or suspect baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods or postal parcels under controlled conditions if no available treatment or process will otherwise be successful; and 

- refuse departure or entry 

Article 18 point 2 means that the WHO/UN will have control over every country’s ability to: have no specific health measures before advising them, review all travel manifests and routing which is a lack of privacy, implement inspections without proper due process from a court order, implement chemical treatments of any kind on baggage, cargo, any shipping container, all goods, textiles, food, and all postal parcels.

Dead human bodies would be at the disposal choice of the WHO, which is an unelected body that is foreign to Indonesia. They could choose to get rid of all traditional burial ceremonies. The would be able to implement isolation or quarantine which means prison. Why should the WHO be able to imprison anyone in a country foreign to their headquarters?

3. (New) in Issuing such recommendation: The WHO should consult with other relevant international organization such as ICAO, IMO, WTO to avoid unnecessary interference with international travel and trade, such as the movement of essential health care workers and medical products and supplies. 

4. (New) in implementing such recommendation: State Parties shall take into consideration their obligations under relevant international law when facilitating essential health care workers movement, ensuring protection of supply chains of essential medical products in PHEIC, and repatriating of travellers. 

Article 18, Point 3 & 4 are the new implementations that the Indonesian government would like to see. However, this still gives away all power and control for Indonesian decision making to The Who, ICAO, IMO, and WTO. THese new additions are also restricting the movement and travel of not only Indonesian medical workers, but also giving a foreign entity control over the supply chain of medical products and pharmaceuticals. Indonesia will no longer be able to govern what pharmaceuticals or natural products go in and out of the country. This has to be unacceptable.

Article 23 Health measures on arrival and departure 

1. Subject to applicable international agreements and relevant articles of these Regulations, a State Party may require for public health purposes whether in paper based or digital format, in arrival or departure: 

(a) with regard to travellers: 

(i) information concerning the traveller’s destination so that the traveller may be contacted; (ii) information concerning the traveller’s itinerary to ascertain if there was any travel in or near an affected area or other possible contacts with infection or contamination prior to arrival, as well as review of the traveller’s health documents if they are required under these Regulations; and/or 

(iii) a non-invasive medical examination which is the least intrusive examination that would achieve the public health objective; 

(b) inspection of baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods, postal parcels and human remains. 

Article 23, Point 1: This will allow for the WHO/UN to be in complete control and surveillance of all of the information of travellers going to and from Indonesia. This will also allow for people to be subject to forced examination of their body and cargo, which could negatively affect tourism. 

2. On the basis of evidence of a public health risk obtained through the measures provided in paragraph 1 of this Article, or through other means, States Parties may apply additional health measures, in accordance with these Regulations, in particular, with regard to a suspect or affected traveller, on a case-by-case basis, the least intrusive and invasive medical examination that would achieve the public health objective of preventing the international spread of disease. 

3. No medical examination, vaccination, prophylaxis or health measure under these Regulations shall be carried out on travellers without their prior express informed consent or that of their parents or guardians, except as provided in paragraph 2 of Article 31, and in accordance with the law and international obligations of the State Party. 

Article 23, Point 3: This will allow for the foreign entity WHO/UN to forcefully example minor children. 

Article 31 Health Measures relating to entry of travellers 

1. Invasive medical examination, vaccination or other prophylaxis shall not be required as a condition of entry of any traveller to the territory of a State Party , except that, subject to 

Articles 32 42 and 45, these Regulations do not preclude States Parties from requiring medical examination, vaccination or other prophylaxis or proof of vaccination or other prophylaxis whether in paper based or digital format; 

(a) when necessary to determine whether a public health risk exists; 

(b) as a condition of entry for any travellers seeking temporary or permanent residence; 

(c) as a condition of entry for any travellers pursuant to Article 43 or Annexes 6 and 7; or 

(d) which may be carried out pursuant to Article 23. 

2. If a traveller for whom a State Party may require a medical examination, vaccination or other prophylaxis under paragraph 1 of this Article fails to consent to any such measure, or refuses to provide the information or the documents referred to in paragraph 1(a) of Article 23, the State Party concerned may, subject to Articles 32, 42 and 45, deny entry to that traveller. If there is evidence of an imminent public health risk, the State Party may, in accordance with its national law and to the extent necessary to control such a risk, compel the traveller to undergo or advise the traveller, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 23, to undergo 

(a) the least invasive and intrusive medical examination that would achieve the public health objective; 

(b) vaccination or other prophylaxis; or 

(c) additional established health measures that prevent or control the spread of disease, including isolation, quarantine or placing the traveller under public health observation 

Article 44 Collaboration and assistance 

1. States Parties shall undertake to collaborate with each other, to the extent possible, in: 

(a) the detection and assessment of, and response to, events as provided under these Regulations; 

(b) the provision or facilitation of technical cooperation and logistical support, particularly in the development, strengthening and maintenance of the public health capacities required under these Regulations 

(c) (new) strengthening capacity to identify health threats including through surveillance, research and development cooperation, technological and information sharing. 

(d) the mobilization of financial resources to facilitate implementation of their obligations under these Regulations; and 

(e) the formulation of proposed laws and other legal and administrative provisions for the implementation of these Regulations 

(f) (new) facilitating the provision of equitable access to medical countermeasures

Article 44 Point1  is going to give away an autonomy which surveillance, logistical, financial information Indonesia can share, and gives the power to WHO to direct funds wherever they deem necessary to. 

2. WHO shall collaborate with States Parties, upon request, to the extent possible, in:

 

(a) the evaluation and assessment of their public health capacities in order to facilitate the effective implementation of these Regulations 

(b) the provision or facilitation of technical cooperation and logistical support to States Parties; and 

(c) the mobilization of financial resources to support developing countries in building, strengthening and maintaining the capacities provided for in Annex 1 and Annex 6 

3. Collaboration under this Article may be implemented through multiple channels, including bilaterally, through regional networks and the WHO regional offices, and through intergovernmental organizations and international bodies. 

In Article 44 Point 2, Nowhere does it state Indonesian authority in decision making, only ‘international organisations and intergovernmental bodies and WHO’, this just again shows that they are trying to take away the authority of decision making from Indonesia.

Article 45 Treatment of personal data 

1. Health information collected or received by a State Party pursuant to these Regulations from another State Party or from WHO which refers to an identified or identifiable person shall be kept confidential and processed anonymously as required by national law 

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, States Parties may disclose to only internal and relevant personnel and process personal data where essential for the purposes of assessing and managing a public health risk, but State Parties, in accordance with national law, and WHO must ensure that the personal data are: 

(a) processed fairly and lawfully, and not further processed in a way incompatible with that purpose; 

(b) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to that purpose; 

(c) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete are erased or rectified; and 

(d) not kept longer than necessary. 

3. Upon request, WHO shall as far as practicable provide an individual with his or her personal data referred to in this Article in an intelligible form, without undue delay or expense and, when necessary, allow for correction 

Article 45 states that all data will be given to a foreign entity that is based inUSA and Geneva, this is a violation of many countries’ privacy act. Its a form of espionage acting from a foreign entity standpoint.

ANNEX 6 

VACCINATION, PROPHYLAXIS AND RELATED CERTIFICATES 

1. Vaccines or other prophylaxis specified in Annex 7 or recommended under these Regulations shall be of suitable quality; those vaccines and prophylaxis designated by WHO shall be subject to its approval. Upon request, the State Party shall provide to WHO appropriate evidence of the suitability of vaccines and prophylaxis administered within its territory under these Regulations. 

2. Persons undergoing vaccination or other prophylaxis under these Regulations shall be provided with an international certificate of vaccination or prophylaxis (hereinafter the “certificate”) in the form specified in this Annex or in any digital format as being used in the country. No departure shall be made from the model of the certificate specified in this Annex.

 

3. Certificates under this Annex or any digital format are valid only if the vaccine or prophylaxis used has been approved by WHO or/and by State Parties. 

4. For paper based format, certificates must be signed in the hand of the clinician, who shall be a medical practitioner or other authorized health worker, supervising the administration of the vaccine or prophylaxis. The certificate must also bear the official stamp of the administering centre; however, this shall not be an accepted substitute for the signature. 

5. For digital format, certificates must be presented with QR code that contains the information mentioned on the Model International Certificate of Vaccinations or Prophylaxis and should be aligned with any current guidelines or/and agreed by state parties 

6. Certificates shall be fully completed in English or in French. They may also be completed in another language, in addition to either English or French. 

7. Any amendment of this certificate, or erasure, or failure to complete any part of it, may render it invalid. 

8. Certificates are individual and shall in no circumstances be used collectively. Separate certificates shall be issued for children. 

9. A parent or guardian shall sign the certificate when the child or a person with disability is unable to write. The signature of an illiterate shall be indicated in the usual manner by the person’s mark and the indication by another that this is the mark of the person concerned. 

10. If the supervising clinician is of the opinion that the vaccination or prophylaxis is contraindicated on medical grounds, the supervising clinician shall provide the person with reasons, written in English or French, and where appropriate in another language in addition to English or French, underlying that opinion, which the competent authorities on arrival should take into account. The supervising clinician and competent authorities shall inform such persons of any risk associated with nonvaccination and with the non-use of prophylaxis in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 23. 

11. An equivalent document issued by the Armed Forces to an active member of those Forces shall be accepted in lieu of an international certificate in the form shown in this Annex if: 

(a) it embodies medical information substantially the same as that required by such form; and 

(b) it contains a statement in English or in French and where appropriate in another language in addition to English or French recording the nature and date of the vaccination or prophylaxis and to the effect that it is issued in accordance with this paragraph.

  difficult to understand the articles 

Annex 6 insinuates that we need digital passports to track our health. This is proposterous and clear violation of everyone’s health privacy. Digital passports will lead to complete government control of everyone’s health, finances, privacy and security. They should be rejected at all costs.